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INCOME TAXATION AND THE CALCULATION
OF TORT DAMAGE AWARDS: THE RAMIFICATIONS
OF NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY V. LIEPEL T
Benjamin Franklin once noted that nothing is certain in this world
except death and taxes.' Although death is certain, selected provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) diminish the certainty of taxation.
Section 61 of the Code defines gross income as all income from whatever
source derived, unless otherwise specifically excluded.2 Section 104(a)(2)
of the Code excludes recoveries of personal injury or sickness damages
from gross income.' The tort award exclusion applies to wrongful death
awards,' personal defamation awards,5 and lost income recovered in per-
sonal injury actions.' The income that a tort victim receives from the in-
vestment of a tort damage award, however, is taxable.
7
Defendants often attempt to inform juries in personal injury actions,
through both evidence and jury instructions, that damage awards are
not taxable. In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt,8 a wrongful death
' Letter from Benjamin Franklin to M. Leroy (1789), reprinted in J. BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 423 (14th ed. 1968).
' I.R.C. § 61(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1960). The Supreme Court has held that the
Code's definition of gross income indicates a congressional intent to tax all pecuniary gains
except those specifically excluded. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430
(1955). By avoiding restrictive categories of taxable receipts, the Code's definition of gross
income allows Congress to exert the full measure of its taxing authority. Id. at 429.
1 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1970). Section 104(a)(2) expressly excludes
"the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal
injuries or sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies to both compen-
satory and punitive damages awarded in personal injury actions. Rev. Rul. 45, 1975-1 C.B.
47, 47. The exclusion, however, does not apply to reimbursements of medical expenses that
the taxpayer has deducted previously on his income tax return. I.R.C. § 104(a).
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496 (1980); Anderson v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97, 97 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1960). See also Rev. Rul. 19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180.
1 William Q. Wolfson, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1847-14, 1847-21 (1978); Dorothy E. Wallace, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 954, 959 (1976). In 1958, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that although the
compensatory portion of a personal defamation award is excludable, the punitive portion of
a personal defamation award is taxable. See Rev. Rul. 418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, 19. Revenue Rul-
ing 45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, however, recognized that § 104(a)(2) excludes "any damages," whether
compensatory or punitive, recovered in personal injury actions. Id. at 47; see I.R.C. §
104(a)(2). Since recoveries in personal defamation suits come within the meaning of damages
for personal injuries under § 104(a)(2), punitive damages in personal defamation suits are ex-
cludable. Therefore, the Service's position in Rev. Rul. 418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, that punitive
damages for personal defamation are taxable, is erroneous. Awards for defamation of one's
business reputation, however, are taxable. Mason K. Knuckles, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182, 184-85
(1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965).
' Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1249 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 883 (1971).
Stephen Trez, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 640, 641 n.3 (1976); Rev. Rul. 29, 1965-1 C.B. 59, 59.
' 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
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action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act9 (FELA), the Supreme
Court addressed two questions concerning the role of taxes in damage
award calculations."0 The first question was whether evidence of the ef-
fect of taxes on the decedent's past and estimated future earnings is
admissible to reduce an FELA award based on those earnings.1' The sec-
ond question was whether trial courts can refuse a requested jury
instruction on the nontaxability of an FELA award.12 Although both of
these questions involve the effect of income taxes on the calculation of
damage awards, the two questions are analytically distinct. 3 Defendants
offer tax evidence in an attempt to reduce lost income awards to an
amount that represents the tort victim's lost after-tax income." Defen-
dants request nontaxability instructions, however, to prevent juries
from improperly inflating awards under the mistaken belief that awards
are taxable."1 Since the admissibility of tax evidence and the need for the
9 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) governs the
financial responsibility of interstate railroads for injured employees and supersedes all
state law actions otherwise available to such employees. Missouri Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Wulf,
226 U.S. 570, 576 (1913). The FELA authorizes a wrongful death action for the benefit of the
survivors of railroad employees negligently killed in the course of their employment. See 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1976); note 87 infra.
,0 444 U.S. at 491. Although Liepelt dealt specifically with a wrongful death action
under the FELA, the case will have a direct impact on actions brought under certain other
federal tort-type statutes. See text accompanying notes 85-94 infra.
,1 444 U.S. at 491. In an FELA wrongful death action, the measure of damages is that
portion of the decedent's lost gross income that would have gone to the support of his
family. Id. at 493.
" Id. at 491.
," See Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 296 (9th Cir. 1975); Dempsey v.
Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952). Numerous commentators have recog-
nized the distinction between the tax evidence issue and the jury instruction issue. See, e.g.,
Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death is Tax-Exempt:
Should We Tell the Jury?, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 320, 330 (1965); Feldman, Personal Injury
Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 ARiz. L. REV. 272, 280 (1966); Morris
and Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J.
274, 275 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Morris]; Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury
Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212, 212-15 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Nordstrom]; Roettger, The
Cautionary Instruction on Income Taxes In Negligence Actions, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1,
2 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Roettger]; Note, Computation of Lost Future Earnings in Per-
sonal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 11 IND. L. REv. 647, 667 (1978).
Several courts, however, have erroneously confused the two issues. See, e.g., St. Johns
River Terminal Co. v. Vaden, 190 So. 2d 40, 42 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966); Highshew v.
Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 505, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956). In Highshew, the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected a nontaxability instruction after finding that the charge would involve com-
plex tax matters requiring expert assistance. 235 Ind. at 505, 134 N.E.2d at 556. The High-
shew court's rationale confused the jury instruction issue with the tax evidence issue.
Although the use of tax evidence to reduce lost income awards creates problems of com-
plexity, the nontaxability instruction is not complicated. See note 40; text accompanying
notes 43-46 infra.
U See note 27 infra.
15 See text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
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nontaxability instruction are distinct issues, a court may exclude tax
evidence and still instruct the jury that a damage award is nontaxable."6
In Liepelt, a fireman employed by Norfolk & Western Railway Com-
pany (N&W) was killed in a locomotive collision.17 The administratrix of
the fireman's estate, Liepelt, brought a wrongful death action under the
FELA against N&W.18 At the trial, N&W sought to introduce evidence
showing what the decedent's net income would have been after taxes.19
N&W also requested a jury instruction that any award would not be sub-
ject to income taxes.0 The trial court refused to admit the tax evidence
and denied the requested jury instruction.21
On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's
rulings on both the evidentiary and jury instruction issues.' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Illinois Supreme
Court denied N&W leave to appeal.' The Supreme Court reversed the
Illinois Appellate Court and held that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit the tax evidence and in refusing to give the nontaxability instruc-
tion.'4
Addressing the evidentiary question, the Liepelt majority reasoned
that the measure of recovery in an FELA wrongful death action is the
amount of money that the decedent would have contributed to the sup-
"' In Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), the Missouri Supreme
Court rejected the use of tax evidence, but held that the nontaxability instruction was re-
quired. Id. at 346, 251 S.W.2d at 45. Similarly, the Third Circuit in Domeracki v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1971), required a nontaxability instruction, but indicated
in dictum that it would reject the use of tax evidence. Id. at 1250. Although evidence of the
effect of taxes on lost income is limited to cases involving awards for lost income, the non-
taxability instruction also is applicable to actions involving any type of nontaxable damages.
For instance, a defendant might request a nontaxability instruction to prevent the jury
from improperly inflating an award of medical expenses.
I? 444 U.S. at 491.
IS Id. Liepelt was tried in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Id. Although
federal substantive law controls actions under the FELA, a plaintiff may bring an FELA ac-
tion in either a federal or state court. Castro v. Chicago, Rock I. & P. R.R., 81 Ill. App. 3d
233, 236, 401 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1980).
11 444 U.S. at 492. N&W offered to prove through the testimony of an actuary that
federal income taxes would have reduced the decedent's future earnings by $57,000. Id.
N&W offered this evidence to reduce the amount of the award necessary to compensate the
victim's family for lost pecuniary benefits. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
' 444 U.S. at 492. N&W requested that the trial judge instruct the jury: "your award
will not be subject to any income taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the
amount of your award." Id.
21 Id.
I Liepelt v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 62 Ill. App. 3d 653, 668-69, 378 N.E.2d 1232, 1245 (1978),
reversed, 444 U.S. 490 (1980). Noting that the federal circuit courts differed on the tax
evidence and jury instruction questions, the Illinois Appellate Court relied on earlier Illinois
decisions to uphold the Liepelt trial court. Id.
444 U.S. at 491.
z Id. at 490-98. Justice Stevens wrote for the Liepelt majority. Id. at 490. Justice
Blackmun and Justice Marshall dissented. See id. at 498-504 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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port of his family if he had survived." The Court noted that income taxes
reduce the amount of money that a wage-earner can contribute to the
support of his family.28 After-tax income, rather than gross income,
therefore, provides the more realistic measure of the pecuniary loss to
the decedent's survivors.' The majority concluded that since the dece-
dent's after-tax income was the proper measure of damages, N&W's in-
come tax evidence was admissible. 8
The Liepelt majority rejected the plaintiff's argument that evidence
on the effect of future income taxes is too speculative and complex for
the jury.' The majority reasoned that juries already engage in extensive
speculation when they calculate awards for lost future earnings.2 Addi-
tionally, the majority stated that the courts and the trial bar have devel-
oped effective methods for presenting complex issues, such as future tax
consequences, to juries in an understandable manner
2 1
The plaintiff also argued that income tax evidence should not be
admissible because the courts do not compensate successful FELA plain-
tiffs for attorney's fees.2 The Liepelt majority rejected the compensa-
Id at 493; accord, Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913).
444 U.S. at 493; accord, Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 291 (9th Cir.
1975). In calculating FELA wrongful death awards, courts deduct the portion of the dece-
dent's lost income that the decedent would have spent for personal expenditures. See Kan-
sas City Ry. v. Leslie, 238 U.S. 599, 604 (1915). Courts deduct estimated'personal expen-
ditures because such expenditures would not have gone to the support of the decedent's
survivors. 444 U.S. at 494.
' Id. at 493. The purpose of compensatory tort damages is to place the tort victim in
the position in which he would have been had the tort not occurred. Burlington N., Inc. v.
Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 291 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Nordstrom, supra note 13, at
215-18. Proponents of the admissibility of tax evidence argue that basing lost earnings
awards on lost gross income, rather than lost net income, overcompensates the plaintiff. See
id. at 219. If the tort had not occurred, income taxes would have reduced the victim's earn-
ings to the after-tax amount. The use of gross income in calculating the award, therefore,
overcompensates the victim by replacing both his net income and the taxes that he no
longer needs to pay. Id.
444 U.S. at 493-96.
Id. at 494. A common objection to the use of tax evidence is the complicated, conjec-
tural nature of such evidence. For instance, the Second Circuit has reasoned that use of lost
net income, rather than lost gross income, would require intensive speculation on questions
of future tax exemptions, deductions, credits and tax rates. McWeeney v. New York, New
Haven & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). See also
Taenzler v. Burlington N., 608 F.2d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co.,
510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1245 (1976); text accompanying
notes 45-52 infra.
' 444 U.S. at 494. Courts and juries engage in speculation when they estimate damage
elements such as the victim's future employment, earnings and personal expenditures. Ad-
ditionally, future inflation and interest rates are areas of estimates and predictions. See id.
" Id. The Liepelt majority did not explain how courts and lawyers could present tax
evidence to juries in an understandable form. See id.; note 46 infra.
' 444 U.S. at 495. The failure of courts to reduce awards to lost after-tax income
arguably is offset by the failure of courts to compensate tort victims for their attorney's
fees. McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960).
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tion argument, reasoning that under the traditional "American Rule"
attorney's fees are not essential to the full compensation of the prevail-
ing litigant.' The majority indicated that courts should not ignore the
relevant factor of income taxes to offset an unfair rule regarding attor-
ney's fees.- The Liepelt majority held, therefore, that the tax evidence
was admissible. 5
Addressing the question of whether the trial court erred in refusing
N&W's nontaxability instruction, the Liepelt majority noted that few in-
dividuals are aware of the statutory exclusion for personal injury
awards.3 8 Since most jurors do not know of the exclusion, a jury might
improperly inflate an award to offset an imaginary tax.' The majority
also noted that the amount of the plaintiff's damage award greatly ex-
ceeded the dollar figure that the plaintiff's expert witness had computed
at trial.3 The majority, therefore, assumed that the Liepelt jury improp-
erly inflated the award to offset imaginary taxes. Considering the risk
of improper inflation and the simple, 0 harmless4 nature of the nontaxa-
1 444 U.S. at 495. Under the "American Rule," a court generally will not award at-
torney's fees to a successful plaintiff in the absence of statutory authorization. Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-50 (1975).
444 U.S. at 495-96.
Id. at 493-96.
Id. at 496-97; accord, Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d
Cir. 1971); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952).
1 444 U.S. at 496-97. The courts that have required the nontaxability instruction
assume that juries occasionally increase awards to offset imaginary taxes. See, e.g., Burling-
ton N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir. 1971); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d
42, 45 (1952). Conversely, the courts that have refused the instruction assume that juries
will not go beyond their specific instructions. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, New
Haven & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1960); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135,
150-51, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955).
' 444 U.S. at 497. At trial the plaintiff's expert witness computed damages of $302,000
plus the value of the care and training that the decedent would have provided to his chil-
dren. Id. The Liepelt jury, however, awarded the plaintiff $775,000. Id. The Liepelt dissent
argued that the discrepancy in the amount was not necessarily the result of a mistaken
belief that the award was taxable. Id at 503 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent sug-
gested that the increase in the award could have been due to either the value of training
and care which the decedent would have provided to his children, or to the jury's belief that
the defendant was insured or obligated for substantial attorney's fees. See id.
Id. at 497; see notes 37 & 38 supra.
, A nontaxability instruction would require neither expert testimony nor complicated
inquiries into the plaintiff's future exemptions, deductions, marital status, or tax brackets.
See Nordstrom, supra note 13, at 231. A court could give the instruction in two or three
nonconfusing, carefully worded sentences. Id. See also Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
443 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1971). The instruction, therefore, would not burden the court
or the jury. Burlngton N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975).
" Some courts have argued that knowledge that the award is tax exempt might influ-
ence juries to decrease the award improperly. See, e.g., Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d
135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955); Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 445, 129
N.E.2d 771, 772 (1955). See also Note, Propriety of Comment on Non-Taxability of Personal
Injury Verdicts, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 156, 157 (1953).
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bility instruction, the Liepelt majority held that the nontaxability in-
struction was required."
Prior to Liepelt, a majority of the courts that had considered the
issue had excluded income tax evidence. 3 The Liepelt majority's deci-
sion to allow the use of tax evidence in FELA damage award calculations
has both practical and theoretical drawbacks." In terms of practicality,
Liepelt will force juries to make complex and conjectural tax computa-
tions, which in turn will require the assistance of extensive expert
testimony." The Liepelt majority did not respond convincingly to the
argument of several trial lawyers associations that tax evidence will
transform simple tort actions into complicated tax trials.46 Since the
In Wagner, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed a lower court decision because the
lower court had given a nontaxability instruction. 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 445, 129 N.E.2d 771,772
(1955). At the first Wagner trial, the jury returned a $130,000 verdict for the plaintiff. Id. On
retrial, the second jury, which received a nontaxability instruction, awarded the plaintiff
only $80,000. Id. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court reasoned that the nontaxability
instruction was prejudicial to the plaintiff. Id. The difference in the awards, however, might
have resulted from the first jury improperly inflating the recovery by $50,000 to offset an
imaginary tax on the award. See Morris, supra note 15, at 276. Commentators have sug-
gested that careful wording of a nontaxability instruction will avoid problems of prejudice
to either party. See id.; Nordstrom, supra note 13, at 237; Roettger, supra note 13, at 14-16.
See also text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
42 444 U.S. at 496-98.
43 Most federal circuits have refused to allow the use of tax evidence in damage award
calculations. See, e.g., Taenzler v. Burlington N., 608 F.2d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1979); Kalavity
v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1978); Kennett v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 560
F.2d 456, 463-64 (1st Cir. 1977); Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir.
1977); Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1975; McWeeney v.
New York, New Haven & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 35-39 (2d Cir. 1960). But see Mosley v. United
States, 538 F.2d 555, 558-59 (4th Cir. 1976); Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284,
294 (9th Cir. 1975). Similarly, most state courts have refused to allow the use of tax evidence
to reduce awards. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626,
667-68, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 422 (1978); Lumber Terminals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App.
82, 97, 373 A.2d 282, 291 (1977); Geris v. Burlington N., Inc., 277 Or. 381, 386, 561 P.2d 174,
180 (1977). But see Adams v. Deur, 173 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Iowa 1969); Floyd v. Fruit Indus.,
144 Conn. 659, 666-67, 136 A.2d 918, 925-26 (1957). See generally cases cited in Annot., 63
A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959 & Supp. 1976).
" See text accompanying notes 45-65 infra.
," The use of tax evidence at trial will overshadow completely the basic issues of liabil-
ity and damages. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir.
1960). See generally Nordstrom, supra note 13, at 228-29. The difficulty of predicting the
future of the Code, the unknown individual decisions of the taxpayer, and the innumerable
variables that enter into tax liability make the required tax calculations too complex for
most jurors. See Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 89-90 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). See generally Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d
234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1975); Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626,
667-68, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 422 (1978).
" See text accompanying note 31 supra. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America
opposes the use of tax evidence in damage award calculations on the grounds thai tax evi-
dence is too complex to present effectively to juries. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America at 16-17, Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 100 S. Ct.
755 (1980). See also Brief Amicus Curiae for 34 State Trial Lawyers Associations at 11-12,
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
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calculation of a tort victim's lost after-tax earnings is extremely com-
plex, Liepelt will result in greater litigation costs and longer trials.
Furthermore, the Liepelt majority's decision to allow tax evidence
opens the door to other complicated calculations." In Liepelt the major-
ity indicated that plaintiffs may introduce evidence of the effect of taxes
on the income that discounted lump-sum awards theoretically earn.48
Plaintiffs would offer this evidence to decrease the discount rate that
courts use in reducing lost income awards to present value.49 Alterna-
tively, plaintiffs would introduce this evidence to increase their dis-
counted awards by the amount of the taxes on the income that their dis-
counted awards theoretically earn." In either case, consideration of the
effect of future taxes on the income that discounted awards theoretically
earn will compound the problems of complexity under Liepelt.5
Since Liepelt holds that evidence of the effect of federal income taxes
on lost earnings is admissible, defendants may argue that evidence of
other payroll deductions is also admissible. Defendants may attempt to
present evidence of state and local income taxes, social security taxes,
" Liepelt will cause additional problems of complexity in cases where a tort victim has
outside sources of income, such as investments, which continue to generate earnings after
the tort. See Nordstrom, supra note 13, at 229-30. A tort victim's future outside income will
affect the tax rate applicable to his lost future wages. The jury, therefore, must consider in-
come, which continues after the tort, in calculating the lost earnings award. Id. at 230.
. See 444 U.S. at 495; text accompanying note 7 supra. Courts discount FELA wrong-
ful death awards to present value. Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Moser, 275 U.S. 133, 135-36
(1927). The present value of an award is that amount which, if reasonably invested, will
allow the plaintiff to withdraw annually a sum equal to one year's lost pecuniary benefits,
over a period equal to the decedent's life expectancy. Id; see note 49 infra.
" See note 48 supra. Consider the following example. Assume that a decedent would
have contributed $50,000 a year to the support of his family for a period of 20 years. Assume
further that the decedent's survivors can earn 10% interest by investing the award pro-
ceeds. The present value of the survivor's lost benefits is $425,860, a sum which, if invested
at 10%, will fully compensate the survivors by allowing them to withdraw $50,000 at the
end of each year for 20 years. See DAVIDSON, HANDBOOK OF MODERN ACCOUNTING, app. 4
(1970). Taxes, however, will decrease the actual rate of return on the investment of the
lump-sum award of $425,860. See text accompanying note 7 supra. Consequently, the court
must adjust the 10% discount rate downward to reflect the after-tax interest that an invest-
ment of the award will earn. See generally 444 U.S. at 495; see also text accompanying note
50 infra.
The admissibility of the plaintiff's tax evidence will require the jury to add back into
the award an amount to compensate for the taxes due on the interest. See Nordstrom, supra
note 13, at 227. See generally 444 U.S. at 495; McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & H.
R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1960); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1348 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972). Since the add-back represents compensation for
future taxes, the jury also must reduce the add-back to present value.
"I Even a certified public accountant would have difficulty calculating the adjustment
necessary to account for the tax liability on the income. Scruggs v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
320 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Va. 1970). The amount of the tax adjustment depends on the
income recipient's future tax liability, since the income recipient, rather than the decedent,
will pay the taxes on the income. Consequently, the jury would have to consider not only
the decedent's future income taxes, but also the survivor's future taxes on the income that
the award earns.
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and unemployment insurance deductions. Although courts may exclude
evidence of some payroll deductions as de minimis,5 2 the adjustment of
awards to account for the more substantial payroll deductions will in-
volve further speculation and complexities.
Liepelt also may indirectly affect the admissibility of inflation evi-
dence in damage award calculations. Prior to Liepelt, the Supreme
Court, in Grunenthal v. Long Island Railroad,' refused to set aside a
damage award that provided for inflationary increases in the plaintiff's
lost income." Despite the use of inflation evidence in Grunenthal,
several circuits have continued to exclude evidence of inflation.5 One of
the principal reasons that courts refuse evidence of inflation is that the
evidence is too speculative.' The Liepelt majority, however, indicated
that evidence of inflation is no more speculative than evidence of future
taxes." The Liepelt decision, therefore, may force courts that have re-
fused inflation evidence to revise their positions. The use of complex in-
flation evidence at trial, however, will further complicate the calculation
of lost earnings damage awards.
Aside from the practical problems that Liepelt creates, the major-
ity's decision to allow the use of tax evidence to reduce the tort-feasor's
liability violates the collateral source rule. Under the collateral source
rule, a tort-feasor cannot reduce the amount of his liability by showing
that the tort victim has received compensation from other sources as a
result of the tort. 8 Under present tax law, Congress may tax awards of
lost earnings in personal injury actions. 9 Congress' refusal to do so
52 See 444 U.S. at 494-95 n.7.
393 U.S. 156 (1968).
Id. at 160. The award in Liepelt provided for annual five percent increases in the
decedent's lost income. 444 U.S. at 492.
1 See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 235-41 (5th Cir. 1975) (infla-
tion evidence too speculative, not predictable); Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804, 807
(1st Cir. 1970) (inflation evidence too speculative). But see Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger,
529 F.2d 284, 287 (9th Cir. 1975) (expert testimony on inflation not speculative).
See note 55 supra; II F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, 1325-26 (1956).
See 444 U.S. at 494.
Thompson v. Milam, 115 Ga. App. 396, 396, 154 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1967). See generally
Sedler, The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury Damages: The Irrelevant Principle
and the Functional Approach, 58 KY. L.J. 36, 38-40 (1969); Note, Unreason in the Law of
Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1964). The purpose of the
collateral source rule is to prevent the tort-feasor from benefitting from the relief that the
tort victim receives from other sources. Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 926-27 (3d
Cir. 1964). As a result of the collateral source rule, however, the tort victim recovers an
amount beyond that necessary to make him whole. Id. at 926. The collateral source rule,
therefore, is an exception to the general rule that compensatory tort damages should
replace only the tort victim's actual losses. See also text accompanying notes 64-65 infra.
5' As a general rule, Congress may tax any gain, including that portion of a damage
award which represents lost income. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,
430 (1955); Phoenix Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 420, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1956); Raytheon
Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 100, 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
Awards for lost income that a plaintiff recovers in a non-personal injury action are taxable.
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bestows a collateral benefit on tort victims equal to the amount of taxes
that the victims otherwise would have to pay. 0 Although Congress' in-
tent in giving tort victims this benefit is unclear,' the use of tax evi-
dence effectively deprives the tort victim of the benefit.6' Since the use
of tax evidence allows tort-feasors to reduce their liability by the taxes
that the government has decided to forego, Liepelt violates the col-
lateral source rule.
6 3
Admittedly, refusing to admit tax evidence may overcompensate the
tort victim." Congress could avoid overcompensation of the tort victim
and eliminate the use of tax evidence by repealing the statutory exclu-
sion of lost income awards. Since Congress has not repealed section
104(a)(2), however, Congress apparently has chosen to allow overcompen-
sation of plaintiffs.' The Liepelt majority ignored this congressional
decision and therefore erred in holding tax evidence admissible.
The Liepelt majority's decision to require the offered nontaxability
instruction, however, was correct.6 Although no good method exists for
See 231 F.2d at 422-23; Watkins v. Commissioner, No. 319-79 T (Ct. Cl. April 11, 1980); Rev.
Rul. 341, 1972-2 C.B. 32, 32.
10 Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (D.N.J. 1975); see note 61 infra. See also 444
U.S. at 500-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Congress originally excluded personal injury damage awards because Congress did
not consider tort damages to be taxable income within the meaning of the sixteenth amend-
ment. See H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918); 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308
(1918). Under present tax law, however, Congress could tax lost income awarded in personal
injury actions. See note 59 supra. Several courts and commentators have suggested that the
continued existence of the exclusion is the result of a congressional intent to bestow a
humanitarian benefit on tort victims. See, e.g., 444 U.S. 501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1978); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F.
Supp. 64, 89 (D.N.J. 1975); Note, Income Tax Effects on Personal Injury Recoveries, 30 LA.
L. REV. 672, 685 (1970); 69 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1956). The administrative problems that
would result from taxing lost income awarded in personal injury actions also may have in-
fluenced Congress' decision to continue to allow the exclusion. See 444 U.S. at 501 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
" See Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (D.N.J. 1975) (citing Epmeier v. United
States, 199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952)).
1 See generally Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1978); Huddell
v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (D.N.J. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory
Notes § 914(a), Comment b. at 136 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1973). Several commentators also
have adopted the collateral source rationale for rejecting the use of tax evidence. See, e.g.,
Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 701, 734 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Yorio]; Comment, Income Tax Effects on Personal
Injury Recoveries, 30 LA. L. REV. 672, 685 (1970); 69 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1956). But see
Nordstrom, supra note 13, at 222-23.
See note 27 supra. But see note 58 supra.
See note 63 supra. The Liepelt dissent reasoned that the majority's decision to allow
tax evidence violated Congress' intent to exclude lost income awards. 444 U.S. at 502 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). See also 69 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1956).
' The Liepelt dissent reasoned that Illinois procedural law governed the jury instruc-
tion issue. 444 U.S. at 503-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Since the Illinois courts did not re-
quire the nontaxability instruction, the dissent concluded that the trial court's failure to
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determining what takes place in the jury room,"' several cases indicate
that jurors, on their own initiative, consider taxes when calculating
awards.68 Defendants, therefore, face a significant risk that jurors will in-
flate awards improperly to offset imaginary taxes."9 Since the need to
prevent improperly inflated awards outweighs the minimal burden of
giving the nontaxability instruction," courts should give the nontaxa-
bility charge.7'
Since Liepelt requires a nontaxability instruction, if a party requests
such a charge, courts must consider what constitutes a proper instruc-
tion. Two commentators have suggested an instruction which directs the
jury to neither add to nor subtract from an award on account of taxes.
2
The suggested instruction eliminates the possibility of prejudice to
plaintiffs by expressly forbidding juries to subtract from the award
give the charge was not error. Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent conceded,
however, that Illinois procedural law was not controlling if the state law interfered with
federal policies. Id. Federal policy limits the measure of damages in FELA wrongful death
actions to the survivor's lost pecuniary benefits. Id. at 493. Since a refusal to give the non-
taxability instruction can result in an award exceeding lost pecuniary benefits, the Illinois
procedural rule allowing such a refusal interferes with federal policy. Therefore, federal
law, rather than state law, controlled the jury instruction issue in Liepelt.
67 See Kalven, The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO
ST. L.J. 158, 163 (1958); Klevorick & Rothschild, A Model of the Jury Decision Process, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 141, 142 (1979).
" See, e.g., Kennett v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 560 F.2d 456, 461-62 (1st Cir. 1977) (jury
inquired during deliberations about tax ramifications of award); Towli v. Ford Motor Co., 30
A.D.2d 319, 319, 292 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (1968) (jury inquired during deliberations whether plain-
tiff had to pay taxes on award). See also cases cited in Roettger, supra note 13, at 6.
" A danger exists that today's tax-conscious jurors will believe mistakenly that an
award is taxable and therefore increase the award to compensate the plaintiff fully after the
imaginary tax is taken out. 444 U.S. at 497; II F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §
25.12, at 1327-28 (1956).
70 See note 40 supra. The Liepelt dissent argued that the nontaxability instruction is
purely cautionary and therefore unnecessary. 444 U.S. at 502-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissent suggested that once courts begin to restrict jury actions, courts will not be able
to define a logical ending point. See id. The dissent's argument ignores the common use of
cautionary instructions to clarify affirmative charges. See Morris, supra note 13, at 275.
Courts normally require certain cautionary instructions to prevent prejudice to litigants.
For example, a court must instruct the jury to ignore prejudicial comments made by the
trial judge. See Pager v. Pennsylvania R.R., 165 F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 1947).
" Prior to Liepelt, most federal courts did not require the nontaxability instruction.
See, e.g., Taenzler v. Burlington N., 608 F.2d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1979); Kennett v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 560 F.2d 456, 461 (1st Cir. 1977); Nicholas v. Marshall, 486 F.2d 791, 794 (10th
Cir. 1973); Greco v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 464 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 990 (1973). But see note 37 supra. Similarly, most state courts have not required
the instruction. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, __, 298 P.2d 1034, 1038, mod.,
301 P.2d 1032 (1956); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 152, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955).
But see Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952).
72 See Morris, supra note 13, at 276. The instruction that N&W requested in Liepelt
did not prohibit the jury from subtracting from the award on account of taxes. See note 20
supra; text accompanying notes 73-74 infra.
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because of taxes."3 In actions where evidence of the effect of taxes on lost
earnings is admissible, the court should give the jury two tax-related in-
structions. The first instruction should direct the jury to reduce the
award to an amount which represents the plaintiff's lost after-tax in-
come. The second instruction should inform the jurors that once they
have calculated the award based on after-tax income, they should not
add to the award on account of taxes.
7 4
Liepelt will have varying effects on actions other than FELA wrong-
ful death claims. The Supreme Court did not decide Liepelt on a con-
stitutional basis.75 Therefore, while Liepelt is binding precedent in
FELA actions brought in state courts, 7 the decision is not binding on
state court actions involving common law or state statutes. 77 The Liepelt
decision also is not binding precedent in diversity actions brought in
federal courts. 8 Liepelt, therefore, can have only a persuasive effect on
state and federal courts applying state law. Similarly, Liepelt has no
direct effect on actions under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA).9
7 See note 41 supra.
A jury instruction not to subtract from the award on account of taxes might confuse
jurors when the court alsb instructs the jurors to reduce the tort victim's award to an
amount representing after-tax income.
" In Liepelt, the Supreme Court based its opinion exclusively on the FELA. See 444
U.S. at 492-93. If Liepelt had involved constitutional matters, the decision would be binding
on the states as the supreme law of the land. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335
(1946); Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965).
7" Pursuant to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI, § 9,
decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal law are binding on all
state courts. United States v. Gilbert Assocs., 345 U.S. 361, 363 (1952); United States ex rel.
Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
The Illinois Court of Appeals has recognized that Liepelt is controlling in FELA actions
brought in the Illinois Courts. See Oltersdorf v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 83 Ill. App. 3d 457,
-, 404 N.E.2d 320, 324-25 (1980).
" In our bifurcated judicial system, the states' highest courts, rather than the United
States Supreme Court, are the final arbiters of questions of state law. Union Pac. R.R. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 247 U.S. 282, 287 (1918). The Supreme Court's interpretation of a
federal statute, therefore, does not control a state court's interpretation of state law. Miller
v. School Dist. No. 167, 500 F.2d 711, 711 (7th Cir. 1974). In South v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1980), a wrongful death action under North Dakota law, the
North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a trial court's refusal to give a nontaxability instruc-
tion. Id. at 827. The South court indicated that Liepelt was not controlling in state actions.
Id.
78 See, e.g., Croce v. Bromley Corp., No. 78-2627, slip op. at 8414-15 (5th Cir., August
14, 1980) (Liepelt inapplicable in wrongful death action predicated upon state statute);
Spinosa v. International Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154, 1158 (1st Cir. 1980) (Liepelt does not
mandate nontaxability instruction in action controlled by New Hampshire law); Vasina v.
Grumman Corp., 492 F. Supp. 943, 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (Liepelt inapplicable in diversity ac-
tions).
79 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1976 &
Supp. II 1978).
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The FTCA allows tort actions to be brought against the United States."0
State law however, governs the measure of damages in FTCA actions,8'
unless such damages are punitive.82 Since Liepelt is not binding on state
damages law, Liepelt is not controlling in FTCA actions.' Even if
Liepelt were controlling, the holding on the jury instruction question
would be inapplicable because FTCA actions are tried without juries.u
For actions under the Jones Act," however, Liepelt will have a direct
effect on the calculation of damages.8 The statutory language of the
FELA governs wrongful death actions and personal injury actions
7
under the Jones Act.8 Similarly, the measure of damages under the
Death on the High Seas Act 8 (DOHSA) is the same as the measure of
- Id. §§ 1346(b), 2674. The FTCA waives a portion of the federal government's sover-
eign immunity by enabling plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages against the federal
government. Id. § 2674.
I In FTCA actions, courts must apply the law of the state where the tort occurred. Id
§ 1346(b); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); see Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 321 (1957). Therefore, state law determines the measure of damages in an
FTCA action. Ferrero v. United States, 603 F.2d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1979).
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) (punitive damages not allowed under FTCA).
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have allowed income tax evidence in FTCA actions,
despite contrary state law, under the theory that failure to do so would result in punitive
damages. See Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 668-70 (9th Cir. 1976); Hartz v. United
States, 415 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1969). The Ninth Circuit in Felder reasoned that use of
the tort victim's lost gross income, rather than lost net income, results in a punitive award
since the award exceeds the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff. 543 F.2d at
668-70. The Fifth Circuit in Hartz reasoned that to the extent that the applicable Georgia
wrongful death statute allowed a recovery of more than lost net income, the statute was
punitive. 415 F.2d at 264.
28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The Jones Act provides seamen with a modified common law
remedy for negligent personal injuries. De Zon v. American Presidential Lines, Ltd., 129
F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 660 (1943). An injured seaman has the option to
bring an action under the Jones Act or to seek a remedy under traditional maritime law.
Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 388 (1924). The Jones Act also provides for a wrong-
ful death action by the personal representative of a seaman who dies in the course of his
employment. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); see note 88 infra.
See Nesmith v. Texaco, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 561, 563-64 (W.D. La. 1980) (Liepelt ap-
plicable to action under Jones Act).
Although Liepelt specifically involved a wrongful death action, the decision is
equally applicable to personal injury actions under the FELA and the Jones Act. The dis-
tinction between wrongful death actions and other personal injury actions does not justify a
refusal to allow tax evidence or a refusal to give an offered nontaxability instruction. Hooks
v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Several courts already
have applied Liepelt to personal injury actions. See Cazad v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 622 F.2d
72, 76 (4th Cir. 1980); Nesmith v. Texaco, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 561, 563-64 (W.D. La. 1980);
Oltersdorf v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 83 Ill. App. 3d 457, -, 404 N.E.2d 320, 325 (1980).
' See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 38 (1943). The Jones
Act provides that all federal statutes conferring or regulating actions for death or injury to
railroad employees, including the FELA, are applicable. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976). DOHSA provides for a wrongful death action in ad-
miralty on behalf of persons who are killed on the high seas. Id. § 761. Personal representa-
tives of a deceased seaman may recover under the Jones Act or under the DOHSA. See
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396 n.12 (1970).
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damages for wrongful death under the FELA.9 0 Therefore, Liepelt also
will be controlling in actions under the DOHSA.
Additionally, Liepelt will have an impact on civil rights actions
brought under Title 42, U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 grants a cause of ac-
tion to any person who is deprived of his civil rights by action under col-
or of state law.91 Although courts measure section 1983 damages by
referring to common law damage rules," federal law governs section
1983 actions. To the extent that a section 1983 award is nontaxable,9 4
therefore, courts in section 1983 actions must give a requested nontaxa-
bility instruction and admit income tax evidence.
The Liepelt court's decision to allow income tax evidence to reduce
awards representing lost earnings is incorrect. The allowance of tax evi-
dence burdens juries with compounded, complex tax calculations that
will require expert assistance and protracted trials.95 The use of tax evi-
dence to reduce awards also violates the collateral source rule by appro-
priating for the tort-feasor a benefit that Congress has bestowed on the
tort victim. 6 A better solution to the problem of overcompensation of
plaintiffs would be the repeal of the exclusion of lost income awarded in
personal injury actions.97 The Liepelt Court's decision to require the noni-
taxability instructions, however, is correct. A nontaxability instruction
that is worded to prevent prejudice to either-party" will eliminate the
substantial risk that juries will miscalculate awards.9
KENNETH B. TILLOU
Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 788 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976), cerL dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1978); National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400, 403-04, 404 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
, See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978) (common law of torts is starting
point for § 1983 damage inquiries); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1978) (general
principles of damages should apply to civil rights actions).
93 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); see Comment, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal
Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEx. L. REv. 1015, 1023 (1967).
A civil rights award that represents back pay is taxable if personal injuries are not
the basis for the award. See Watkins v. United States, No. 319-79 T (Ct. Cl. April 11, 1980);
Willie B. Hodge, 64 T.C. 616, 620-21 (1975); Rev. Rul. 341, 1972-1 C.B. 32. Neither the courts
nor the Service, however, has addressed the question of whether a civil rights award that
does not represent backpay is taxable. Arguably, an award representing lost constitutional
rights is closer to a nontaxable recovery of capital.
'5 See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
